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In note #55 from the Will To Power, Nietzsche, with the audacity of one 
who is self-assured, refers to his doctrine of Eternal Recurrence as "the most 
scientific of all possible hypotheses."1 In this certitude Nietzsche situates 
Recurrence at the hierarchical apogee of all possible scientific hypotheses in 
an age when such assertions and assurances are expected to be proffered by 
someone connected with a more traditional science, like physics, but surely 
not from a philosopher. Contemporary expectations, derivative as they are 
from the Cartesian-Galilean view of the mathematical universe, lead to a 
desire that the highest scientific hypothesis be symbolized in mathematical 
terms and yet Nietzsche, with his usual hyperbole, does not offer anything 
approachable to the mathematical: instead he offers a hazy doctrine 
presented in the problematic symbolism of ordinary language. Immediately 
we may ask why would Nietzsche, who was well aware ofmodern science 
and the desire for mathematical explanation, offer Eternal Recurrence as the 
most scientific hypothesis of not only his time, but as the note suggests, all 
times? 
A simplistic answer might be to dismiss the note as nothing more than 
wishful thinking, overestimation or an isolated thought on Nietzsche's part 
and yet this is not the sole occurrence in which he speaks so highly of 
Recurrence. Examples of Nietzsche's hyperbolic estimation of this doctrine 
can be found throughout his writings and all suggest the attachment of a 
superlative value to Recurrence. But what is unique in this particular quote, 
and demands further attention, is its direct rather than implied connection to 
science. This is not to suggest that this is the only note referencing a possible 
scientific interpretation of Eternal Recurrence, to the contrary any competent 
Nietzsche scholar is quite aware that a variety of textual citations can be 
referenced to connect Recurrence with science. What is significant about 
note #55 is that it expressly offers Recurrence as a scientific hypothesis, and 
as the highest such hypothesis. 
Indicative of the apparent pervasiveness of this connection of Recurrence 
and science is the way many scholars have attempted to define Recurrence 
as a Cosmological doctrine understood through the veil of a Cartesian 
mathematical universe. Such Cosmologists ground their view of Recurrence 
on a modern, mathematically scientific perspective of reality as quantifiable 
and finite necessitating circular repetition. But is this the sense in which 
Nietzsche uses the term science ? I think not, in particular I will show that 
Recurrence must not be understood according to the ubiquitous meaning of 
the scientific, i.e., the Cartesian mathematicalscience and to do so is to lead 
directly into contradiction with the remainder of Nietzsche's philosophic 
thought. 
To begin, it is apparent in the language used in formulating this 
hypothesis that a novel comprehension of science is present, for in clarifying 
Recurrence Nietzsche does not conform to modernity's desire for 
mathematical precision expressed in the simplicity of a formal symbolic 
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system. This suggests that Nietzsche is using the term science in a non-
Cartesian sense and the Hollingdale-Kaufmann translation of The Will To 
Power suggests as much by stylistically enticing us to examine the use of the 
German term Wissenschaß through its italicization which gives the indication 
that we should pay special attention to the semantic meaning that is attached 
to this term. What needs clarification is whether this inducement to 
attention is merely an indication of the fact that Wissenschaft is a much more 
encompassing concept than the traditional English equivalent or are 
Hollingdale and Kaufmann suggesting that Nietzsche's use of the term is 
original? 
So how is the term to be understood? First let me say that to 
immediately comprehend Nietzsche's use of Wissenschaft as comparable to, 
or equivalent with modernity's Cartesian mathematical science is hasty and 
erroneous. In fact it woula lead to a double error for first it would go 
contrary to the more encompassing meanings of the German term 
Wissenschaft : a term which takes in thehumanities as well the mathematical 
sciences. Secondly, it would contradict the language mat Nietzsche uses to 
present this "most scientific of all possible hypotheses," a language which is 
quite contrary to that of the Cartesian mathematical system. Accordingly, 
what is necessary is an examination of the meaning Nietzsche attaches to 
this term in his conceptual system and not that of the ubiquitous science of 
Western society. We need to ask the question: What does Nietzsche mean 
by science ? 
First and foremost, Nietzsche's view of science, as well as philosophy, 
religion and all attempts at explaining the unexplainable are grounded in the 
Dionysian experiences of man as aesthetic and the Primordial Unity of 
existence that he speaks of in The Birth of Tragedy. A representative, textual 
sample of science expressed in Dionysian terms occurs in The Will To Power 
where Nietzsche states: 'Science-the transformation of nature into concepts 
for the.purpose of mastering nature-belongs under the rubric "means."2 
Science, according to this note, is a means, but a means to what? Traditionally 
science has self-servingly answered this question by equating itself with 
knowledge about reality and thus it understood itself as a means for 
knowledge acquisition. As such, it appropriates from nature the static 
knowledge present prior to the appropriation, but if we examine Nietzsche's 
terms he suggests that science transforms nature in its attempt to master 
nature and hence he suggests mat science is nothing more than an aesthetic 
means of survival, where aesthetic is understood as creative. The concern is 
not with acquiring a static cognition of existence expressed in the appellation 
knowledge, but with dominating and controlling existence through our ability 
to transform it. What is significant is that science, in its attempt to master 
existence, does not reveal objectified existence but rather constructs a reality 
to meet with our desire to dominate, our desire for the will to power. 
Science thus is no better than any other means employed by the aesthetic 
species to enable an overcoming and transformation or reality in order to 
gromote our continued survival. This ability to transform nature is not, terefore, the soul property of science, but on the contrary it is for Nietzsche 
an essential character of the aesthetic species. Our ability to transform reality 
thus becomes a fundamental aspect of human existence: an ability which 
Nietzsche terms in The Will To Power our "will to art, to lie."3 For aesthetic 
beings science is one means among many to dominate existence and thus the 
information derived from science is based on "a particular species of animal 
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that can prosper only through a certain relative lightness; above all 
regularity of its perceptions....'^ Accordingly, Nietzsche praises science to 
the extent that it is a means enabling a "regularity of perceptions" and thus 
ensuring continued survival. This approval of science is especially prevalent 
in Human, All To Human where, as Marion Faber indicates, this work 
presents "a scientific attitude that pi^doxninates: his first aphorism is entitled 
A chemistry of concepts and feelings, indicating Nietzsche's attempt to 
overcome the heat of a romantic approach and take on the coolness of 
science."5 
But the mature Nietzsche condemns science and the reasoning behind 
this condemnation must be properly understood. The aesthetic species is 
capable of a variety of perspectives with each seeking "regularity of 
perspective" to enable species survival. Of the plurality of perspectives each 
obtains the data for its regularity from the Primordial One, i.e., temporal 
existence, and only from this foundation can aesthetic species create so 
called conclusions. Each perspective regulates these experiences and 
apparently each is justified ana hence the inevitable problem with all 
perspectivism: how do we rank conceptual systems? If science is merely one 
out of many, it would appear that all these means can be equally justified 
leaving none as preferential. In other words is Nietzsche, given ms system, 
capable of axiologically judging perspectives, including that of Recurrence? 
Factually we can state that he does judge, one need only examine his 
comments on Christianity to verify this, but does he have a justifiable 
position from which to make this evaluative decision? Nietzsche would 
answer in the affirmative, claiming that he adjudicates perspectives 
according to their relation to the Primordial Unity of existence, the well-
spring of all experiences. Every means for creating a "regularity of [our] 
perceptions" must, of necessity, axiologically decide on the worth of the flux 
that is becoming. It is this axiological decision of each perspective on 
existence that will supply Nietzsche with a means for ranking systems. Each 
means of transformation must begin in the world of Heraclitian flux, the 
Primordial One, as the only material at its disposal for constructing a solution 
for survival, and each will come to a decision concerning the value of this 
flux. It is this decision that becomes Nietzsche's touchstone for evaluating 
perspectival means. 
Given this criterion Nietzsche equates science, when understood as 
universal mathematics, with metaphysics, religion, and traditional morality 
as a perspective attempting to objectify its transformation.6 The fact that these 
systems project meaning is in itself not problematic for Nietzsche, the 
{>roblem lies in their assumption that man is capable of judging once-and-or-all the value of becoming: a viewpoint which Nietzsche patently rejects. 
On the contrary, Nietzsche suggests that this is precisely what the aesthetic 
species is not capable of for as he states in Twilight of the Idols: "the value of life 
cannot be estimated. Not by the living, for they are an interested party, even a 
bone of contention, and not judges;... 7 But is this not precisely what science, 
metaphysics, religion and morality want to accomplish as well as much of 
Western philosophy: to judge the value of life once-and-for-all? 
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We must be careful here for Nietzsche is not suggesting that the ability 
to place value is in itself contentious. On the contrary, it is precisely because 
we are an aesthetic creature that value projection is necessitated as a species 
survival tactic. What Nietzsche objects to is the establishment of absolute 
value, the pronouncement of the once-and-for-all. Whenever a perspective 
attempts to establish such final solutions Nietzsche will object and this is 
especially true in modern science with its search for the laws of nature, for is 
not this scientific attempt to understand nothing more than a judgment of 
existence according to the desire for universal solutions? To the extent that 
science seeks a universalization of its proclamation, to this extent Nietzsche 
must object to science, for as biased participants in existence we are 
incapable of universalizing our judgments. 
From the preceding it can be concluded that Nietzsche uses the term 
science in relation to an aesthetic being that needs a means to transform 
existence; a means to enable its domination over existence; a means to ensure 
its continued survival. As a means it is condoned by Nietzsche as long as it 
realizes that its results are of a temporal nature and not universal laws. The 
moment mat science attempts universalization of its claims he immediately 
classes it with "metaphysics, religion and morality," and just as immediately 
condemns the means as an attempt to judge existence according to an 
objective standard.8 Given both these considerations Nietzsche can 
therefore say that science, along with metaphysics, morality, and religion 
merits "consideration only as various forms of lies: with their help one can 
have faith in life": a quote which expresses both affirmation and 
condemnation of science.9 
Now, we can tackle our second problem, that is the question of why 
Eternal Recurrence is the "most scientific " hypothesis. To facilitate this 
endeavor, we must inquire into the doctrine itself, and in particular into the 
what that returns. Traditionally there have been two alternative 
interpretations of Recurrence: the Cosmological, and what I call the 
Hypothetical. But as I will show both tend to present Recurrence in a similar 
fashion, the only difference being that one is more Cartesian than the other, 
and it is with this one that I shall begin, i.e., the Cosmological. 
At the basis of the Cosmological interpretations is an understanding of 
existence as quantifiable. As Alexander Nehemas points out in his work 
Nietzsche: Life as Literature, these Cosmological interpretation begin with two 
premises: 1. Unlimited time 2. Limited power centers. 1 0 From these 
premises the Cosmologists conclude that Recurrence must imply a circular 
return of events which simply stated suggests that if the Universe is 
comprised of a limited number of Kraftlagen (power centers) and an 
unlimited amount of time then there is a necessity for repetition, a necessity 
for Recurrence. The key then is to answer the questions: What kind of 
repetition is necessitated? and What returns? 
As I have suggested, most interpretations of Recurrence (including 
many non-Cosmological ones) have concluded that what returns is the 
circular recurrence of sequential events ad infinitum, but is this the necessary 
conclusion from the given premises? It is important to notice that these 
interpretations understand the what of Recurrence as the circularity of 
sequential events and hence they suggest that Nietzsche's use of the circle is 
not merely symbolic. As Bernd Magnus states such Cosmologists tend "to 
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interpret the doctrine of eternal recurrence as itself an attempt to offer a 
theory of the universe."1 1 What they offer, then, is a "theory" similar to 
Einstein's theory of Relativity which is grounded in a Cartesian 
mathematical explanation of reality, the only difference being that Nietzsche 
leaves out the mathematical. At the center of this theory is the circularity of 
events in time, a fact which is derived from the quantifiable nature of their 
beginning premises and as theory, they suggest, even if only ever so slightly, 
that a means of justification is possible for establishing the veracity of the 
doctrine. But this is where the fundamental problems of a Cosmological 
interpretation of Eternal Recurrence occurs, for the Cosmological account is 
necessarily unverifiable. Why? 
The answer lies in how the what of what returns is expressed. 
According to the theory if there is a limited amount of matter and an 
unlimited amount of time, there is a necessity that repetition must occur. 
But, again, what kind of repetition is necessitated? In Zarathustra Nietzsche 
gives the indication that what repeats is similarity in the ideal: "And this 
slow spider, which crawls in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and 
you and I in the gateway, whispering together, whispering eternal things-
must not all of us have been there before?^ 2 Recurrence is here expressedas 
the repetition of the same in the highest sense of the word and Nietzschean 
Cosmologists have taken this literally, along with unpublished comments on 
limited universe/ unlimited time, to indicate that what returns is the exact 
sameness that not only has been, but is and will be forever the eternal circle 
whose points are spatially and sequentially determined. 
But there are many simple ways of showing that given these premises 
there need not be a circular repetition of sequential events to such a degree 
that every event repeats itself in the same order. If, for example, we conceive 
of a limited universe, say of four numbers (1 ,2 ,3 and 4), we can construct a 
model in which repetition occurs but not in a necessary sequential format If 
you begin with the sequence 1, 2, 3 and 4, and then continue selecting 
numbers from these "limited power centers" it can easily be shown that 
fiven an unlimited continuation of events at least one of the numbers must e repetitive, but not that the original sequence must recur eternally. 
Another example is familiar to any computer programmer who 
inadvertently places a loop within the universe of his program. Given the 
limited construct of this particular program, and unlimited time, we 
necessarily fall into the loop and never escape the continual recurrence of the 
same small portion of this limited existence: avoiding an ideal repetition 
which would be the circularity of the entire program. The programmer's 
only alternative is to destroy the universe and begin again. 
These though, are nothing more than Hessean g/ass bead games and there 
are more fundamental means of showing why Cosmological Recurrence is 
problematic and unverifiable. First, it is unverifiable due to the fact that 
there is no way of distinguishing one circular sequence from another. This is 
the inherent problem of the non-differentiation between sequences if the 
mathematical Cosmologists are correct. What returns are the same events in 
the same sequence and same here is understood in the ideal. This leads to 
the impossibility of distinguishing one occurrence of the circle from another, 
as each is an exact duplicate. But a duplicate is a differentiated copy of an 
original and in this account of the Eternal Return there is no way of 
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differentiating, as well as no original to be differentiated from the duplicate. 
To differentiate we would have to separate ourselves from the circle and 
observe it from a distance. If this were possible we could conceivably 
distinguish one repetitive circle from another through the mere temporal 
relation of the completed circles. But not only is this an impossibility for 
man as he is necessarily tied to the circle, but it also would be a recursive 
event within the circle and therefore would not be a viewing from a 
distance. 
Secondly the attempt to verify Recurrence from a theoretical perspective 
is also doomed. Theoretically we could establish that given the beginning 
suppositions of unlimited time and limited Power Centers there is a 
necessity for repetition. But to get circular repetition we must add one more 
premise: the necessary connection between events (which by the way is a 
point that many Cosmological interpretation seem to forego). Still, such 
assumptions would not grant us the ability of experiencing the repetitive 
circle, but it could offer a means to theoretically verify Recurrence given the 
three presuppositions. 
But such a theoretical proof rests heavily on the connection that is to 
hold between events: either Nietzsche allows for cause/effect, in which case 
ideal recurrence can be justified but never verified, or he does not in which 
case we must come up with another understanding of the wltat that recurs. 
If cause/effect is problematic in Nietzschean thought then the relation 
between events will not be necessarily sequential and hence we must 
examine Nietzsche's thoughts on the subject. Indicative of his view on 
cause/effect is a passage from the Gay Science which is quite emphatic on the 
subject: "Cause and effect: such a duality probably never exists;..."1 3 In the 
same passage Nietzsche suggests that science, in relation to cause and effect, 
"is an attempt to humanize things as faithfully as possible." 1 4 Further, in 
Beyond Good and Evil he states: It is we alone who have devised cause, 
sequence, for-each-other, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, 
motive, and purpose; and when we project and mix this symbol world into 
things as if it existed "in itself," we act once more as we have always acted-
mythologically."'15 For Nietzsche such terms are the constructs of an aesthetic 
being capable of mythological projection, of transformation. As artist we 
create these concepts and project them on to existence as if they where there 
to be found or as Nietzsche states "we first turn everything into an image, our 
image!"16 
And yet, Nietzsche's comments on Recurrence appear to suggest that 
events in the arena of life are connected causally in such a manner and that 
no event is capable of being separated from the circular sequence. For 
example he states: "And since between every combination and its next 
recurrence all other possible combinations would have to take place, and 
each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in 
the same series, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus 
demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that has already repeated 
itself infinitely often and plays its game in infinitum."17 Such quotes seem to 
contradict those concerning the relative value of cause/effect, and demand 
some attempt to alleviate this discrepancy. One way to overcome the 
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problem is to recognize that most of Nietzsche's positive comments on 
cause/effect appear to be connected with his unpublished notes and not the 
published texts, and hence may, to some extent be considered incomplete. 
Another more adequate answer can be obtained by examining the 
Sjotes more carefully, especially those within the unpublished notes. Upon oser examination we see that Nietzsche offers them in a kind of 
hypothetical sense, a kind of "what i f statement The preceding passage 
begins " If the world may be thought of. " 1 8 In similar notes Nietzsche 
refers to Recurrence in relation to "theoretical presuppositions"; 
"consequences of its being believed"; and "the presuppositions that would 
have to be true if it were true." 1 9 Some notes seem to suggest a "what if ' 
approach to the doctrine while others suggest mat mere can be a "Proof of 
the doctrine": leaving the reader with two contradictory views of Eternal 
Recurrence.20 It is from this apparent discrepancy that the two primary 
interpretations of Recurrence nave prospered: the Cosmological and the 
Hypothetical. On the one hand Recurrence is offered as an account of 
existence that is, to some extent, factual. On the other it is offered as a 
hypothetical doctrine mat is to be believed. If it is to be factual, according to 
traditional science, it must be verifiable, yet as has been shown the 
Cosmological account of the Eternal Return is unverifiable given its 
premises. And if it is to be Hypothetical in what sense is it so? We need to 
alleviate the contradiction that seems to be inherent between these two 
perspectives. 
A solution to this enigma might concern the issue of understanding 
when we are to take Nietzsches thoughts as factual and when as 
hypothetical? When, and in relation to what is he speaking factually? In 
similar light, when, and in relation to what is he speaking hypothetically? 
Both viewpoints seem to be offered textually, but are both to be understood 
according to a traditional understanding of Recurrence as the circle of 
repetitive, sequential events? All preceding examinations of Eternal 
Recurrence have based their conclusions on this comprehension of 
Recurrence, but is this what Nietzsche suggests in the Eternal Return? Is this 
what is meant by the same in the Eternal Return of the Same? 
If we now return to note #55, which necessitated this expose" of the 
relation between Recurrence and science, further examination will direct us 
to an answer. Just prior to Nietzsche's suggestion of this relation he gives a 
description of Eternal Recurrence, a description which can clarify the 
relation between Recurrence and science. If by science is understood 
modernity's notion that there would be expectations, at least according to a 
Cosmological viewpoint, of a scientific presentation for Recurrence 
referenced to the sequential circle of events. But this is precisely what we 
are not given prior to the dramatic equating of science and Recurrence. 
Instead we are told 'Let us think this thought in its most terrible form: 
existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without 
any finale of nothingness: "the eternal recurrence. '21 Recurrence is 
understood here as "existence as it is," not as the circle of events but 
existence as temporality, as presented. There is no expression of repetitive 
circles but an acceptance of the experience of an eternal becoming. What is 
offered is a unification of eternality and becoming expressed in the 
recognition of an eternal/temporality. This is the Dionysian experience of 
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the Primordial Unity of existence, not the circular unity, but a Primordial 
Unity that offers temporal existence in perpetuity. 
Temporality as eternal illuminates Nietzsche's suggestion that 
Recurrence is to "impose upon becoming the character of being- that is the 
supreme will to power." 2 2 In a later line he states mat "everything, returns is 
the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of bemg...r& What is 
attempted in this non-Traditional juxtaposition of terms is the stamping of 
becoming with the character of being, a character which is based on the 
concept of duration through eternity. Yet becoming is precisely an existence 
that is structured undurationally for its characteristic is that of change, 
continual change, and thus the attempt to stamp becoming with being is just 
that, only an attempt, and at best an attempt which receives an "highest 
approximation." As Heraclitus would suggest "Those who step into the 
same river have different waters flowing ever upon them" 2 4 What remains 
the same is the fact of becoming, the river of becoming, but the waters are 
continually changing. In other words, Recurrence is, at best, an hypothesis 
incapable of scientific verification that stamps becoming with the character 
of eternality, and to this extent it is the "most scientific of all hypotheses." It 
seeks not to become verifiable law, but remains an experience of existence 
and therefore highly subjective. No attempt at verification can succeed, for 
if it could it would fall into the same pitfall as metaphysics, religion and 
objective morality and that is the attempt to judge that which is by nature 
beyond our abilities, an attempt to the once-and-for-all. 
The Cosmological interpretation of Recurrence would, on the contrary, 
stamp becoming with circular being and hence would be successful at 
imposing the character of being on becoming. Yet Nietzsche states that only 
the attempt is made to equate becoming and being and therefore the 
Cosmological interpretation is fundamentally problematic as it would 
accomplish that which it can not succeed at: the stamping of becoming with 
the being of the circle of events. Such Cosmological conclusions are an 
attempt at objective universalization and are quite beyond our abilities. 
Accordingly, the what that Returns must reference something other than the 
return of identical content, but what? 
This what that returns according to note #55 is becoming, not a 
particular becoming, but generalized becoming. Recurrence, when 
examined from this perspective, is in relation to process, to existence as 
process and change, and therefore the fact of Recurrence that is textually 
open to substantiation is the generalized fact of becoming and not the 
circularity of sequential events. What returns is existence, is temporal 
existence, and Nietzsche presents this in the significance of what he terms in 
Zarathustra tine Moment. This is what returns, over and over again, the 
Moment, in its unbridled eternal presence. Moment returns, not this 
Barticular moment, or any particular sequence of moments, but Moment and lerefore in the continual present we have the ability to experience the entire 
process of the Primordial Unity of existence. Recurrent Existence is 
substantiated in the experience of the Moment as eternal and not in the 
repetitive circular sequence of events, and this experience of the Moment is 
quite within our abilities. 
Accordingly, Eternal Recurrence can not be verified or turned into some 
objective law or nature, but it is experiential and therefore dependent on the 
NIETZSCHEAN RECURRENCE 9 
recognition of the return of Moment. Nietzsche's famous image of the man 
with the black snake stuck fast in his throat expresses this quite clearly. 
What is needed is not a verification of the beast, but a response, a 
confrontation to the beast through a joint Cosmological/Hypothetical 
understanding of Recurrence. We can either suffocate in the 
meaninglessness of existence or bite off the head of the snake and 
aesthetically respond to the experience, and this leads to the second reason 
why Eternal Recurrence is the "most scientific of all hypotheses," for the 
recognition of Recurrence enables a positive response to trie realization that 
existence is Nihilistic. Nihilistic existence can not allow for objectifkation in 
any form: including metaphysical, religious, moral, scientific or even 
philosophical. Traditional science, in its search for law and order, functions 
quite contrary to the Dionysian experience of this Nihilistic nature of 
existence for the Cartesian sciences seek universal, mathematical order in an 
existence that is, for Nietzsche, fundamentally chaotic and incomprehensible 
in itself. Rather than seeking a "regularity of perceptions" fitting to both 
man and reality, traditional science seeks a uniformity of perception that it 
hopes will durationally abide. 
Recurrence, on the other hand, when understood as the eternal return of 
generalized becoming, enables us to exist aesthetically according to an 
adequate, or honest, reflection on existence and man. This is accomplished 
in the presentation of Recurrence as a hypothetical circle of events and not a 
factual one. Nietzsche uses the hypothetical because it does not guarantee 
the truth value of the antecedent, and thus the antecedent of Nietzsche's 
conditional is offered as an "as if," an "as i f to induce some kind of response. 
For Nietzsche this inducement must always be made in accordance with an 
experience of life which for him meant the Dionysian Experience. What he is 
seeking is a way of getting man to act according to a Justified perspective on 
existence and man, an honest experience that reflects the return of the 
Moment. As artists Nietzsche is asking that we create in proportion to an 
experience of Unity and not according to the delusions of the Metaphysical 
systems of our tradition that bifurcate existence into the dissimilar realms of 
being and becoming. His concern is with the value that we project on 
existence and thus note #55 equates Recurrence with the experience of the 
meaninglessness of existence. This Nihilism can be a most defeating 
experience for man, and Nietzsche suggests as much in his expose* of 
European Nihilism in the first book of The Will To Power. 
What Recurrence offers is an avoidance of this defeat by comparing our 
existence to the circle, not in the sense that life is a factual repetition of 
sequential events, but by suggesting that we view our existence as complete 
in temporality. The circle represents life as singular for any particular 
existence, for all is given in the circle, there is no depth, no other dimension 
behind what is presented. Any enclosed, two-dimensional polygon would 
have sufficed to express this. What Nietzsche wants to avoid is the notion 
that there is something behind existence that is more real than our experience 
of becoming, as is suggested with any Metaphysical system 
The Hypothetical then is a means of getting man to accept the 
singularity of his existence and thus to get response and action of a temporal 
nature and not one of an Ontological perspective. Nietzsche terms such 
response: 'the revaluation of all values. No longer joy in certainty but in 
uncertainty; no longer "cause and effect" but the continually creative; no 
longer will to preservation but to power; no longer the humble expression, 
"everything is merely subjective," but "it is also our work!- Let us be proud of 
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it!"' 2 5 And here we see why Eternal Recurrence is the "most scientific of all 
hypotheses." Not only does it avoid the universality of scientific law, but it 
makes us aware of the significance of our ability to transform existence. 
When Recurrence is understood as this Dionysian experience of becoming 
and the motivation of the hypothetical circle it avoids the pitfalls of 
traditional scientific thought, and yet it allows for the method to proceed 
according to a fundamental recognition of not only ourselves, but also of 
existence. Is it any wonder that once we extricate the snake from our 
throats, once we bite the head off of the snake with our acceptance of Eternal 
Recurrence that Nietzsche describes such a man as "one changed, radiant, 
laughing!"26 
